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INTRODUCTION
Experts seem to be everywhere in the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Member States' diplomats, lawyers, and regulatory officials are
often referred to and deferred to as experts.' Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) panelists and Appellate Body (AB) officials are chosen because
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, expected May 2003; Ph.D. Can-
didate Anthropology, University of Michigan, expected December 2003, MA Anthropology,
University of Michigan, Dec. 1999; M.Sc. Anthropology and Ecology of Development, Uni-
versity College London, Nov. 1997; B.A. Environmental Studies, Denison University. The
author would like to extend special thanks to Robert Howse, Dirk Pulkowski, Yingtao Ho, and
the Michigan Journal of International Law.
1. Steve Croley and John Jackson speak of giving deference to government and
administrative expertise in WTO Dispute Resolution. Steven P Croley & John H. Jackson,
WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 208-09 (1996).
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they are seen as experts in trade law and dispute settlement. More con-
troversially, expert panelists call upon other experts to help them assess
whether Member States' policies can be reconciled with their commit-
ments to freer trade.
Despite this proliferation of expert recognition, the approaches taken
by WTO commentators to the topic of expertise assume one of two
forms. Some commentators develop issue-centered analyses of particular
trade disputes. These tend to problematize the DSB's use of trade experts
to reconcile Member States' free trade commitments with the values and
knowledge that underwrite policymaking in a particular area such as the
environment.3 Others take this juxtaposition of expertise as granted (i.e.,
trade experts deciding disputes that involve more specific areas of policy
and/or scientific expertise), and instead critique the DSB's procedures
for eliciting scientific opinions. In the latter form, commentators pro-
pose changes in the rules of burden-shifting or legal analysis as remedies
for perceived inadequacies in the process. Common to both approaches
is a narrow understanding of expertise that takes natural scientists and
their knowledge as its Platonic form. Neither approach takes the impor-
tant first steps of asking why individuals in complex societies turn to
experts, who these experts actually are, and how their various profes-
sional, institutional, and cultural contexts might inform, shape and
produce their various expertises.
2. Hathaway opines that the WTO Appellate Body has demonstrated a great degree of
expertise and professionalism in handling international trade issues. C. Michael Hathaway,
Commentary on "The Appellate Body," 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 697, 700 (2000); Article
17.3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding requires that AB members are "recognized
authorit[ies] with demonstrated expertise in [the] law." Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, art. 17.3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (1995)
[hereinafter DSU].
3. See, e.g., Virginia Dailey, Sustainable Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Tur-
tles Conflict at the WTO, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 331, 354-55 (2000) (arguing that the
fact that WTO panelists rarely, if ever, have expertise in environmental trade law means that
environmental concerns will inevitably take a back seat to other trade-centered issues in panel
decisions); see also Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-
Science Organization ": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factflnding in the Growth
Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 254-55 (1998) (exploring the role of scien-
tific experts in the WTO with special reference to the Panel Report, European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/R/USA and WT/DS48/R/CAN
(Aug. 18, 1997), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter collectively, Hormones Panel report] and
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products, WT/DS26/ABIR and WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), http://www.wto.org [herein-
after, collectively, Appellate Body Hormones report].
4. Theofanis Christoforou, Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes in the WTO: a
Critical Review of the Developing Case Law in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 8 N.YU.
ENVTL. L.J. 622, 648 (2000); Dailey, supra note 3; Walker, supra note 3.
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This Note takes this set of questions as a starting point in a discus-
sion of what we as legal scholars, government officials, policymakers,
and concerned citizens of Members States can realistically expect from
WTO expert testimony, and how we can better tailor the dispute settle-
ment process to meet these expectations. Like the work of other WTO
commentators on scientific disputes, this Note focuses on how DSB pan-
elists have used expert testimony in science-based disputes arising over
compliance with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phy-
tosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).' However, the reforms this Note
proposes differ insofar as they are based upon a broader understanding
of expertise, one drawn from social theory and social scientific studies of
scientific communities. In short, it will be argued that the DSB's current
methods for the selection of experts and the elicitation of expert testi-
mony do not adequately reflect what social scientists know about
scientific communities and scientific practice. Changing the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding (DSU) to force DSB panels to be more inclusive
in their selection of experts, and to allow parties to pose questions to ex-
perts directly and to cross-examine their replies would enhance not only
panelists' abilities to evaluate Member States' compliance with their free
trade commitments, but also the WTO's perceived legitimacy in the eyes
of its many observers.
Part I surveys some of the recent contributions that social theorists
and social scientists have made to our understanding of the role of ex-
perts in society, and also the structure of expert communities. Experts are
everywhere in modern life, and individuals are with increasing frequency
asked to extend their trust to experts and bodies of knowledge that they
have little or no opportunity to question. Part II highlights how the WTO
Agreement deals with experts, using recent WTO panel reports to illus-
trate the ways in which the DSB has operationalized its various
provisions. Part III suggests two changes in these DSU provisions that
better reflect current knowledge of expertise as well as the interests of
Members in the dispute settlement process. The Note concludes by revis-
iting the idea of expertise in international economic law in a slightly
different guise in Part IV, this time stressing the importance of asking the
right questions.
5. As I hope will become apparent, an empirically-grounded improvement to our under-
standings of scientific expertise would extend equally, and perhaps more importantly, to the
other forms of expertise regularly called upon in various halls of international trade regulation.
From a legitimacy-enhancing perspective, both perceived legitimacy and real, we ought to be
just as concerned with the W'TO's use and deference to non-scientific experts.
Spring 20021
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I. SOCIAL THEORY AND EXPERTISE
A. Late Modernity and Expertise
The idea that experts should be trusted to address particular types of
problems is not new. Socrates relied on the common sense of this propo-
sition when he asked the rhetorician Gorgias:
Whenever there is a gathering in the city to choose doctors or
shipwrights or any other professional group, surely the rhetori-
cian will not then give his advice, for it is obvious that in each
such choice it is the real expert who must be selected. And when
it is a question about the building of walls or equipment of har-
bors or dockyards, we consult not the rhetoricians, but the
6master builders ....
Among legal theorists, Karl Llewellyn argued for a special role for
experts in adjudication processes, making the commonsense suggestion
that business disputes may be best resolved by panels of expert busi-
7
nessmen.
Despite these earlier pronouncements on the issue, the current use of
experts at the WTO can only be seen as part of a much broader predica-
ment of late modernity at the beginning of the 21st century.8 Being
modern-flying in airplanes, eating government-regulated foods, work-
ing with word processors-requires that citizens place their trust in
products and services developed by others far removed in space and time
from the site of their everyday interactions, forcing them to extend the
.6. PLATO, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, GORGIAS 239 (W.D. Woodhead
trans., Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press Bollingen Series
LXXI 14th ed. 1989).
7. Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARv. L. REV. 465, 512-13 (1987).
8. Of course, Modernity began long before the present. In Literature and Art, modern-
ism is usually defined as "the predominant artistic and literary movement between 1890 and
1945 . .. [o]ften seen as a reaction to the stringent aesthetic formulas and moralism of the
Victorian period...." COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF MODERN LITERARY AND CULTURAL CRITI-
CISM 192 (Joseph Childers & Gary Hentzi eds., 1995). In the present context however, I wish
to use Modernity in a sociological sense referring to the "modes of social life or organisation
which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subse-
quently became more or less worldwide in their influence." ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 1 (1990). Different sociological thinkers have highlighted
different aspects of Modernity, which taken together can be seen as key attributes of our social
world. Marx emphasized the capitalist economy; Weber "the expansion of formal rationality at
the expense of the other types of rationality"; Durkheim the development of social organiza-
tions that bring with them both greater freedom of movement and higher productivity; and
Foucault the development of the State and other disciplines, which meant that subject popula-
tions were increasingly surveilled. GEORGE RITZER, MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 422,
424 (5th ed. 2000).
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trust that they normally reserve to intimates to others who would seem to
be just the opposite. 9 Reliance on these various and manifold expert sys-
tems-complex systems of abstract knowledge developed by
specialists-forms part of an essential and largely unconscious bargain
citizens make to live in complex societies.'0 The conditions of late mod-
ernity leave no choice but to live in a society of enormous complexity,
only some of which is predictable or manageable and much of which
produces anxiety and feelings of vulnerability.
As British sociologist Anthony Giddens suggests, the increasing re-
liance on expertise often takes the form of trust placed in symbolic
tokens (e.g., "don't worry, she's a doctor") and expert systems (e.g.,
medicine)." This trust in expertise derives in part from a long cultiva-
tion of respect for expert communities, a process that begins as early as
grade school field trips. It also is gleaned from experiences with differ-
ent "access points" to expert systems-times and places where, as lay
persons, citizens are forced to extend their trust in expert systems, short
of undertaking the time-consuming task of developing those new ex-
pertises themselves.12 However, Giddens also draws attention to the
basic ambivalence late moderns often feel about trusting expertise. In
part this ambivalence is based on the fact that experts base their opin-
ions, products, and services on things that non-experts cannot fully
understand. It also stems from divergent experiences with experts. Our
trust in experts is generally affirmed when a doctor treats us success-
fully for pain. It is jeopardized, however, when a Ford Explorer
overturns on slightly deflated Firestone tires, as per the
9. The question of whether we may in fact be in a post- or even hyper-Modem phase
takes the point even further. No matter how advanced, disjointed, reflexive, or fast-paced our
social worlds really are, these worlds are premised upon the same extension of trust to experts
at increasingly distant points in time and space, and our points of access to expert systems
have been multiplied and made more complex.
10. The celebrated British sociologist, Anthony Giddens, uses the image of the jugger-
naut to capture the summary effect of late Modernity's complexity on the human condition:
[Late Modernity is] a runaway engine of enormous power which, collectively as
human beings, we can drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of
our control and which could render itself asunder. The juggernaut crushes those
who resist it, and while it sometimes seems to have a steady path, there are times
when it veers away erratically in directions we cannot foresee. The ride is by no
means wholly unpleasant or unrewarding; it can often be exhilarating and charged
with hopeful anticipation. But, so long as the institutions of modernity endure, we
shall never be able to control completely either the path or the pace of the journey.
In turn, we shall never be able to feel entirely secure, because the terrain across
which it runs is fraught with risks of high consequence. Feelings of ontological se-
curity and existential anxiety will coexist in ambivalence.
GIDDENS, supra note 8, at 139.
t1. Id. at90.
12. Id. at 88-92.
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manufacturer's recommendation,' or when we plant genetically modi-
fied corn next to our favorite varietal and end up with an unintended
hybrid.' 4 Moreover, media helps to multiply our experiences with these
points of access through news reports or on-line health information. 5
Thus we hear regularly about the promise of particular expert systems
(e.g., a promising new cancer treatment) but we also hear about their
failures (such as the inability of scientists, until recently, to explain the
relationship between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the so-
called "mad cow" disease, and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), 16 and of
British policymakers to take timely action to stave off a problem of grave
concern"). These access points teach us both to respect and be skeptical
of expert knowledge systems.
Given the importance of access points in bolstering or eroding trust
in expert systems, it should come as no surprise that scientific disputes at
the WTO should be so unsettling to many of the WTO's official and non-
official constituencies.' This Note suggests that the DSB dispute proc-
13. See, e.g., David Schepp, Ford Defends Its Safety Record, BBC NEWS, June 19, 2001,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1397000/1397591.stm (last visited May
10, 2002).
14. John Vidal, Mexico's GM Corn Shocks Scientists, GUARDIAN, Nov. 30, 2001, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4310334,00.html) (last visited May 10,
2002).
15. See, e.g., Web MD, at http://my.webmd.com/drugs-andherbs (last visited May 10,
2002) (an online health information site containing information on drug and herb side effects,
and a listing of recent product recalls, including 4 million Snuggle Teddy Bears).
16. See Jonathan S. Weissman & Jennifer K. Hood, A Rogue Protein, THE LANCET, 358
(Supplement): s53 (Dec. 2001).
17. Among other actions and omissions, British policymakers declined to act on concerns
that "mad cow disease" could jump the species barrier to cause the human vCJD for several
years. BSE Spotlight of Blame, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2000, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk politics/newsid_992000/992641.stm (last visited February 11,
2002); see also Return to an Order of the Honourable the House of Commons Dated October
2000 for the Report, Evidence and Supporting Papers of the Inquiry into the Emergence and
Identification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease (vCJD) and the Action Taken in Response to it up to 20 March 1996 (conclusions of a
House of Commons inquiry into the BSE scandal), available at http://www.bse.org.uk/
report/index.htm; Labelling Blamed for BSE Blunder, BBC NEWS, Nov. 30, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_ 1684000/1684479.stm (last visited February
I1, 2002) (explaining how scientists studying the potential occurrence of the equivalent of
BSE in sheep mistakenly studied mislabeled cow brains for three years).
18. Christoforou observes that Member States have made claims in almost every science-
based trade dispute thus far that panels have mishandled the scientific evidence. See Christo-
forou, supra note 4, at 644-45; Anti-WTO protests offer another type of evidence of how
unsettling some of these disputes have been to particular groups in civil society. See, e.g.,
Patrick O'Connell, Technocrats Versus Turtles, BBC NEWS, Nov. 30, 1999, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_543000/543164.stm (last visited May 10,
2002) (one of many articles about the WTO Seattle protests, where at least some of the pro-




esses themselves have become access points where Member States' con-
stituencies learn about their own and others' experiences with scientific
expertise. The resulting comparisons may not always be reassuring. Dif-
fering national policies in such basic regulatory areas as food safety raise
immediate questions about where and with whom citizens have laid their
trust. For the citizen of one country, learning that her own government
(in which she places her trust) has relied on scientific experts (in whom
she also places her trust) and has chosen a different safety regulation
than another government (with its own trusting citizens) can be discon-
certing. Faced with policy differences regulating basic staples of
modernity--e.g., health codes, food safety, and environmental quality-
whose experts, policy, scientific, or otherwise, should she trust?
B. Expert Systems and the Possibility of Consensus
Sociological and anthropological studies of scientific communities
offer another, albeit lesser known, access point into expert communities
and their knowledge. Scientific research does result in the accumulation
of reliable and accurate knowledge, but the production of this knowledge
is less sealed off from the many influences of context than may often be
assumed. If the production of scientific knowledge is influenced by sci-
entists' specific national, professional, and cultural contexts, then the
WTO rules for the selection and consultation of experts ought to ensure
that both panelists and parties to a dispute are able to consider these in-
fluences.
Many of the implications of context are easily lost without a
comparative understanding of how scientific problems are formed and
pursued. In their 1982 analysis of culture's effects on the identification
of environmental risks, anthropologist Mary Douglas and political
scientist and public policy specialist Aaron Wildavsky called attention to
why and how particular risks are selected over others as requiring further
social and scientific scrutiny.' 9 They argued that the chosen objects of
scientific study often depend on the underlying preferences and
assumptions that populations have about what are and what are not
controllable risks: 20 "[S]ince no one can attend to everything some sort
of priority must be established among dangers.... Ranking dangers so
as to know which ones to address and in what order, demands prior
agreement on criteria."2' Cultural influences, including basic beliefs
regarding pollution and purity, or what is natural and what is artificial,
19. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SE-
LECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982).
20. id. at 67-82.
21. Id. at 3.
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structured these criteria, and led the citizens of one nation to focus on
water quality, while those of another focused on food additives.2
The pursuit of scientific knowledge about risks is not only influ-
enced by culturally specific beliefs regarding what risks might be
controllable, but also by scientists' institutional environments. Thus, an-
thropological studies by Laura Nader, Bruno Latour, and others have
helped to demonstrate how particular scientific discoveries and their dis-
semination can be influenced by different aspects of the scientific
environment including: personal agendas of their proponents; scientific
conventions ranging from laboratory floor plans to the practices of pub-
lishing and peer review; and institutional support scientists are able to
harness in particular times and places.23 Scientific consensus, especially
on issues that require multiple forms of scientific expertise to resolve
satisfactorily, may be more elusive than is often imagined.
Indeed, proposals for reforming the DSB's use of scientific expertise
often fail to appreciate the likelihood of disagreement on even basic is-
sues of scientific fact. Christoforou's recent critique of science-related
trade disputes at the WTO focused on DSB panels' decisions to consult
with experts not on a group basis, but as individuals.24 In short, he argues
that group consultations would force experts to speak to areas of consen-
sus in scientific knowledge while responding to panelists' or parties'
queries.2" In the abstract, this proposition seems logical: let scientists
advise WTO panelists on the obvious areas of agreement in science to-
day. However, when viewed in the light of our divergent experiences
with access points in daily life, and in light of what social scientific stud-
ies of science tell us about the importance of context, the value of the
proposal seems to rest on ill-founded assumptions regarding the homo-
geneity of scientific communities and their knowledge.
22. Id.
23. NAKED SCIENCE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO BOUNDARIES, POWER AND
KNOWLEDGE (Laura Nader ed., 1996); PAUL RABINOW, MAKING PCR: A STORY OF BIO-
TECHNOLOGY (1996); BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE (1988). BRUNO
LATOUR AND STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS
(2d ed. 1986).
24. Christoforou, supra note 4, at 628-29.
25. Id. at 639-41.
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II. THE CONSULTATION OF EXPERTS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCESSES: GUIDELINES AND EMERGING PROCEDURES26
DSB panels have run into more than a few difficulties when faced
with the heterogeneity of expert knowledge and practice. Before describ-
ing how DSB panels have developed procedures for selecting experts
and eliciting advice, the next Section surveys the guidelines established
by Member States.
A. Guidelines for Expert Selection and Solicitation of Advice
The guidelines for DSB panels seeking expert advice are set out in
several sections of the DSU,27 the SPS Agreement, 2 and the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).
29
Under article 13.1 of the DSU, panelists have the right to seek in-
formation and technical advice from any individual or body they deem
appropriate.3" In its adopted Shrimp/Turtle report, the Appellate Body
noted "the comprehensive nature of the authority" given to panels by
article 13, explaining that seeking outside expertise may be "indispens-
ably necessary" to discharge the duty of DSB panels to make "an
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements.
3'
When a dispute concerns an alleged violation of Members' rights
under one of the WTO's covered agreements, the DSU instructs panels
to defer to the more specific guidelines for the consultation of experts
outlined in these agreements.32 Thus, for disputes concerning sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, the Appellate Body noted that the SPS
Agreement actually instructs panelists to seek expert advice whenever
26. It is worth mentioning here that no social scientist has yet been given access to the
panel dispute resolution process for observation. As a result, the entirety of this Note relies on
those aspects of the dispute resolution process that have been revealed to the public in DSB
publications.
27. DSU arts. 8.4, 13.1-.2, app. 4.
28. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, art. 11, vol. 24, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
29. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, art. 14 & annex 2, vol. 27,
1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
30. DSU art. 13.1.
31. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/ABJR, para. 104-06 (Oct. 12 1998), http://www.wto.org [herein-
after Appellate Body Shrimp/Turtle report].
32. DSU art. 1.
Spring 2002]
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necessary. 3 Article 14 of the TBT Agreement provides similarly, though
experts are allowed, not required.34
The DSU, SPS Agreement, and TBT Agreement provide additional
guidelines for the formation of expert and technical advisory groups in
either their appendices or annexes. In appendix 4 of the DSU, the Mem-
bers agree that participation in expert review groups should be restricted
to "persons of professional standing and experience in the field in ques-
tion."3 It further excludes the service of any government officials of
parties to the dispute, and instructs that members of expert review groups
should serve in their individual capacities and not as representatives of
any organizations 6
Unlike the DSU and TBT Agreement, article 11.2 of the SPS
Agreement specifically suggests that advice should come from experts
chosen in consultation with the parties.37 The SPS Agreement annex A.3
lists particular international organizations that may be consulted by pan-
elists to provide guidance on international SPS Agreement standards,
guidelines, and recommendations.38
B. Emerging Procedures for Expert Selection and Consultation
Five science-related trade disputes have come before the WTO DSB
thus far: European Communities (EC)-Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones),39 United States-Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp/Turtle),4° Australia-Measures
Affecting Importation of Salmon (Salmon),41 Japan-Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products (Agricultural Products),42 and European Commu-
33. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,
WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 128 (Feb. 22, 1999), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Appellate Body
Agricultural Products Report].
34. TBT Agreement art. 14.2-3.
35. DSU app. 4.2.
36. DSU app. 4.3.
37. See SPS Agreement, art 11.2, providing that:
[in a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical issues, a panel
should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties
to the dispute. To this end, the panel may, when it deems it appropriate, establish an
advisory technical experts group, or consult the relevant international organizations,
at the request of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative.
Id.
38. SPS Agreement annex A.3.
39. Hormones Panel report, supra note 3.
40. Appellate Body ShrimpfTbrtle report, supra note 31.
41. Panel Report, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/R
(June 12, 1998), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Salmon Panel report].
42. Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R (Oct.
27, 1998), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Agricultural Products Panel report].
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nities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos
(Asbestos)43. Despite the liberal mandate available to DSB panels to seek
expert advice as appropriate, different panels' expert selection processes
have been remarkably consistent, tracking the DSB's first use of experts
in the Hormones dispute." Since then, the panelists in Agricultural
Products and Asbestos have set out in more schematic language similar
systems for the selection of experts.4 '5 First, panelists decide on what ar-
eas they will require expert advice, based on parties' initial submissions.
Next, the panel solicits lists of possible experts, with preference given to
those listed by officials at the international organizations in the covered
agreements (e.g., the SPS Agreement) over experts suggested by the par-
ties.46 Parties then have the opportunity to comment on the curricula vitae
of experts willing to participate, and to make any "major 47 or "compel-
ling" 48 objections to the use of particular experts. The panel in turn
makes its selection from a short-list revised accordingly. The final num-
ber of the experts selected depends on both the number of issues on
which the panel desires to receive opinions, and the number of different
areas the available experts can cover competently.
49
So long as the selected experts are able to comment on issues under
their respective competencies, the DSB panels appear to have arrived at a
fair method for selecting competent experts. However, a closer look at
the selection and testimony of experts in Asbestos and Salmon reveals
how even these guidelines may be insufficient to handle the vagaries of
scientific opinion and practice.
43. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS I 35/R (Sept. 18, 2000), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Asbes-
tos Panel report].
44. In Hormones, the DSB Panel first solicited a list of possible experts from the Secre-
tariat of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) followed by a list of experts from the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). The Panel then asked each party to
suggest three additional experts. The experts who responded to the Panel's solicitations were
each asked to prepare brief curricula vitae that were then circulated to the parties for com-
ment. Based on these comments, the Panel selected its final list: two experts were selected
from the Codex, one from the IARC, and two from the lists suggested by the parties. Hor-
mones Panel report, supra note 3, paras. 6.6-7, 6.10.
45. Agricultural Products Panel report, supra note 42, para. 6.2; Asbestos Panel report,
supra note 43, para. 5.8.
46. Note that only the SPS Agreement requires that panels consult with parties over the
selection of experts, and that in the Asbestos dispute regarding the TBT Agreement, the Panel
decided it did not need to ask parties for their suggestions in this regard.
47. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 43, para. 5.8.
48. Salmon Panel report, supra note 41, para. 6.3
49. Agricultural Products Panel report, supra note 42, para. 6.2(b).
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1. Selecting the Appropriate Experts
First, the range of possible types of expertise that can speak to a par-
ticular issue is often quite broad, and selection of one type of expert over
another may favor particular parties' arguments. The Asbestos dispute over
the legality of a French directive banning the import of chrysotile fibers
under the GAIT 1994 and TBT Agreement, is an instructive example.
During the expert selection phase the parties suggested different types of
experts as advisors on the key issues of the case." Canada suggested that
scientific expertise should be solicited from among those who had direct
and comparative research experiences on the toxicity of chrysotile and
other asbestos fibers, and among experts in the field of risk analysis. They
argued that the experts selected should have specializations in toxicology,
epidemiology, risk analysis, and occupational health.-' Like Canada, the
European Communities (EC) asked that experts selected have specific
knowledge of chrysotile asbestos, but the EC also wanted to ensure that
the epidemiologists selected have specific backgrounds studying asbestos
and cancer. Furthermore, they requested that additional experts be selected
who were able to give opinions on the inapplicability of threshold stan-
dards for regulating exposure to asbestos.52
In sum, the question of what types of experts the panel should consult
was no less controversial than the issues on which they were to comment.
Differing types of expertise were suggested by the EC and Canada, with
the hopes of bolstering one or the other's arguments. Where the EC sought
experts capable of speaking to all the categories of persons who could
come into contact with asbestos and asbestos-containing products-such
as those working in maintenance, repair and construction53-the Canadi-
ans suggested that an expert on risk assessment methods be included,
presumably to better enable their critique of the French government's de-
termination of its appropriate level of risk.
2. The Problem of Institutional Bias in Expert Selection
The parties' exchange with the DSB panel over the selection or exclu-
sion of particular experts from different institutional settings also
underscores the problem of perceived and actual bias in expert testimony.
In the Asbestos case, France argued that the experts should be drawn ex-
clusively from the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), a
specialized agency of the World Health Organization (WHO), and if nec-
50. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 43, paras. 5.1-5.9.
51. Id. para. 5.2.
52. Id. para. 5.5.
53. For example, carpenters, plumbers, heating and cooling repairpersons, workers in in-
sulating materials, and do-it-yourself enthusiasts.
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essary, the International Labor Office (ILO). No experts, France argued,
should have past or present links to industries producing asbestos or sub-
stitute products. 4 On this latter point, they specifically requested that an
expert list not be drawn from the International Organization for Standardi-
zation (ISO)." Canada took issue with France's request that experts
selected by the panel be free from any conflict of interest, suggesting that
the expert selection process and the requirement that a disclosure form be
completed provided sufficient safeguards against bias.56 Ultimately, the
panel ignored France's request to exclude the ISO, and requested lists
from it, the WHO, the IARC, and several other international organiza-
tions.57
While the drafters of the TBT Agreement, DSU, and SPS Agreement
made clear their expectations that experts drawn from the nations involved
in the dispute may tend to favor one party's sets of interests over the oth-
ers, they did not take into account other types of bias that might affect
scientific practice. Although the SPS Agreement lists particular interna-
tional organizations that Members can look to when attempting to
harmonize standards in one area or another, neither the SPS Agreement,
nor the DSU or TBT Agreement, provide mechanisms within dispute set-
tlement procedures to account for the possible biases that may exist among
an organizations' experts in favor of their particular approach to important
areas of panel evaluation such as risk analysis. Indeed, the experts' re-
sponses to questions put in the Salmon dispute suggest the presence of just
this sort of bias.
The Salmon dispute arose over an Australian quarantine proclamation
that restricted the import of untreated fresh, frozen, or chilled salmon, 9
ostensibly to prevent the establishment and spread of particular fish-borne
disease agents.60 Among Canada's claims was the assertion that the quar-
antine measures were not based on a scientific risk assessment in
accordance with articles 2.2, 5.1, and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, and in-
stead constituted protectionist measures for Australia's own salmon
industry.6'
54. Id. para. 5.5.
55. Id. para. 5.14.
56. Id. paras. 5.10, 5.11.
57. The Panel ultimately requested lists from the World Health Organization (WHO), the
International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Programme on Chemical Safety
(IPCS), the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), and the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO). Id. para. 5.20.
58. This point was also noted by Christoforou, supra note 4, at 630-31.
59. See Salmon Panel report, supra note 4 1, para. 1.1.
60. Id. para. 2.11, 2.14 (d)(i).
61. Id. para. 3.2.
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Experts were solicited from the Office International des Epizootes
(OIE) named in the SPS Agreement. At least one of the experts selected
had a strong affiliation with the specific approach that the OIE took to
risk analysis. The comments of this expert, a British scientist named Dr.
Marion Wooldridge, were particularly focused on establishing minimum
requirements for risk assessment, and on differentiating risk assessment
from risk analysis. As she explained, not all fields understand risk as-
sessment in the same manner and she had learned her particular
framework in an OIE/WTO training workshop.62  In fact, Dr.
Wooldridge's particular ideas about what constituted a proper form of
risk assessment (i.e. must it be probability-based, possibility-based, or
some combination?) were not entirely shared by the other experts called
to offer comments. When asked "to what extent, from a scien-
tific/technical point of view, does one have to quantify or use expressions
which qualify a risk assessment for the risk assessment to be deemed
satisfactory?" Dr. Wooldridge took the strongest position, responding
that an analysis based on probability was the minimum requirement for a
risk assessment. 63 In addition, while the other experts agreed with Dr.
Wooldridge that quantitative analyses would be preferable, they dis-
agreed that it constituted a prerequisite, especially given that specific
numbers were not always available on particular diseases and myriad
other conditions that might affect their spread.6
While this difference in opinion about what constitutes a proper risk
analysis may seem trivial, it could have had a significant effect on the
outcome of this particular dispute. Indeed, one of the questions at issue
in the case was whether the Australian government's 1996 risk analysis
report satisfactorily fulfilled the requirement for a scientific risk assess-
ment. While the Panel gave Australia the benefit of the doubt, the
Appellate Body reversed their interpretation of this article 5.1 require-
ment, and completed the analysis using the Panel's findings of fact.
Drawing on the experts' response to Panel questions on what constituted
62. Id. para. 6.7. "By way of general introductory comments, Dr. Wooldridge noted that a
number of different terminology systems were still in use even within the veterinary and ani-
mal health sphere (including fish). In the terminology system now generally advised for use
within this field, risk analysis and risk assessment had different, distinct meanings although in
the past they were often used interchangeably. The term risk analysis as now generally used
comprised four components: hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk
communication. This terminology was taught in the WTO/OIE sponsored Risk Analysis Train-
ing Workshops." Id. (emphasis added).




a proper risk assessment the AB concluded that Australia's 1996 report
had failed to include an adequate risk assessment.65
3. The Solicitation of Expert Advice
Panels for science-based disputes have thus far used a few rules and
procedures to prevent particular forms of expert bias from affecting their
consultations. First, parties have had the ability to raise objections to the
selection of particular experts,' though as we have seen, this right does
not specifically encompass objections to experts' affiliations with par-
ticular organizations or institutions.67 Second, experts used in panel
processes have been non-citizens of the parties to the dispute unless the
parties agree otherwise. 6' Third, at least in Agricultural Products and
Asbestos, the dispute resolution panel prohibited the parties from con-
tacting any of the experts directly, either during the selection phase, or
69throughout the panel process.
The panelists' control over communications with experts has also
extended to the procedures for generating and submitting questions to
experts. ° Playing a familiar role for judges in most civil law traditions,
panels have thus far retained control over the scope of both the written
and the oral submissions of questions to experts. Parties are asked to
submit written questions they would like to have the experts comment
on, but the Panel alone determines the contents of the final list of ques-
tions submitted to the experts for their consideration.
Thus far, panels have submitted questions to experts for their indi-
vidual, rather than group, opinions.7 As was done in Agricultural
65. See Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS 1 8/AB/R, paras. 129, 135 (Oct. 20 1998), http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Appellate
Body Salmon report].
66. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 43, para. 5.8.
67. See supra Section II.B.2.
68. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 43, para. 5.8; Agricultural Products Panel report,
supra note 42, para. 6.2 (d).
69. Agricultural Products Panel report, supra note 42, para. 6.2 (c); Asbestos Panel re-
port, supra note 43, para. 5.8.
70. Agricultural Products Panel report, supra note 42, para. 6.2 (f)-(h).
71. Both Christoforou, a Legal Advisor to the European Commission, and the EC's coun-
sel to the Asbestos dispute take issue with the fact that the Asbestos Panel solicited expert
advice from individual experts, as opposed to the experts acting as a group. They argue that
the ordinary meaning of the language in article 13.2 of the DSU and in article 14.2 of the TBT
Agreement requires Panels to seek expert advice from expert groups. Christoforou, supra note
4, at 647-48; Asbestos Panel report, supra note 43, paras. 5.12, 5.17. David Palmeter and
Petros C. Mavroidis share Christoforou's interpretation of the DSU, but note that the Appellate
Body affirmed the Honnones Panel's decision to obtain the individual opinions of the experts
in this first WTO case involving expert testimony. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 77
(1999).
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Products, Salmon, and Asbestos, experts are instructed to respond in
writing only to those questions they feel competent to address. These
responses are then circulated to the parties for comments.
Following the first round of written questions, and at the request of
either the panelists or one of the parties, the panels convene with the ex-
perts.7" At these meetings the experts have been offered the opportunity
to respond to the parties' comments, with the panelists using their discre-
tion to decide whether to allow the parties to pose additional questions
for clarification purposes."
The opportunities for meetings with experts have produced some
remarkable results. Given the foregoing discussion it should come as no
surprise that the issue of potential bias arose during the meeting con-
vened with experts, panelists, and parties in the Salmon dispute. Though
it is not clear who was responsible for opening this particular line of in-
quiry, several questions were put by the Panel to the experts regarding
the operations of the OlE, its relation to the Fish Diseases Commission
(FDC), and the criteria used to develop standards both for risk assess-
ment and the classification of risks regarding particular disease agents in
fish.74 As part of these questions, the panelists were asked to respond to
an assertion by Australia concerning the lack of transparency of the
FDC's decision-making process. The content of the question helps to
illustrate at least one kind of concern likely held by most parties in
scientific disputes:
"Question 21. Australia states that detailed minutes are not kept
of meetings of the FDC where the categorization of measures to
be applied for a particular disease are discussed. Does the FDC
produce summary reports of these meetings? Are the FDC rec-
ommendations on disease guidelines based on scientific
evaluations or assessments? What is the scientific content of
The Asbestos Panel responded correctly to the EC's complaint on this point by arguing
that the DSU provides its ad hoc panels broad discretion to seek advice from experts in any
manner necessary to arrive at an objective assessment of the factual issues necessary to resolve
the dispute. Asbestos Panel report, supra note 43, para. 5.17. As this Note contends, arguments
that experts should speak only as a group seem to assume either that consensus on scientific
issues is the norm, or that panelists will be unable to develop an objective scientific picture of
an issue when expert advice may differ.
72. It is noteworthy that while both the Asbestos and Agricultural Products panels con-
vened with the parties and experts, only the Agricultural Products Panel acknowledged that
parties had the right to call a meeting with experts to discuss their comments. See Agricultural
Products Panel report, supra note 42, para. 6.2.
73. The Panel reports for both Agricultural Products and Asbestos have appended verba-
tim transcripts of the questions and answers offered during these in-person meetings with
experts.
74. Salmon Panel report, supra note 41, paras. 6.134-6.157.
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FDC reports/records? What processes are under way in regard to
the categorization or classification of fish diseases?"75
The expert replied that while indeed there were no published min-
utes of the meetings, the "scientific content" of the FDC's
epidemiological reports was high. Over the course of several pages of
comments included in the Panel report, the experts gave a description of
the institutional structure, meetings, and practices of the OIE and FDC.
Interesting for Australia's argument that it had performed proper, scien-
tifically-based risk assessment, one expert reported that the FDC has yet
to develop a formal method for the categorization of fish or other animal
diseases, and that new disease agents are added to the organization's lists
based on a'gleanings from peer-reviewed articles or from knowledge
passed by word-of-mouth.76
Nothing too problematic emerged from the experts' responses to the
questions submitted at the in-person meeting with the experts. However,
useful information was brought forth when particular parties were given
the opportunity to ask the experts to respond to their assertions and ques-
tions. The line of questioning that developed regarding the FDC's work
is suggestive of one of several types of concerns raised by parties regard-
ing the specific criteria and methodologies that scientists use to
formulate the standards and recommendations against which government
measures are ultimately evaluated in the panel process.
III. REFORMING THE PANEL PROCESS
Part I reflected on both the proliferation and predicament of exper-
tise in late modernity.77 As "moderns" we have no choice but to trust the
many expert systems that affect our daily lives, yet, the media and other
experiences with access points offer us reasons to question the trust we
extend to experts and the expertise upon which national regulatory poli-
cies are based. Issues of trust become no more certain when citizens
come into contact with access points like the WTO, which sometimes
highlight differences in national regulatory policies. As Part II of this
Note has argued, the DSB's evolving procedures for selecting experts
and eliciting expert opinion do not adequately address the heterogeneity
of influences that social scientific studies of scientific communities and
even DSB panel reports reveal.7 ' The next Sections propose two reforms
to the DSB panel process that could further ensure that the concerns of
75. Id. para. 6.135.
76. Id. paras. 6.135-6.136.
77. See supra Part I.
78. See supra Part II.
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parties regarding the selection of experts and the use of their testimony
are more reassuringly addressed.
Two changes should be made to the procedures by which experts are
selected and questioned under the DSU, SPS Agreement, and TBT
Agreement. Both proposals offer improved mechanisms for addressing
current shortcomings in the panel process, and would thereby help to
increase the perceived legitimacy of the dispute settlement process in the
eyes of its many constituents.
A. Develop an Inclusivity Standard for the DSU
An inclusivity standard should be drafted for the DSU, SPS Agree-
ment, and TBT Agreement. To the extent possible, panels should try to
ensure that different types of expertise requested by parties are brought
to bear on the panels' evaluation of particular factual issues in the case.
Recall that the only explicit criteria presently guiding the selection of
experts is that they (1) not be nationals of the parties in the dispute, or
(2) not be government or other officials serving in that capacity, and (3)
that they should have professional standing and experience in the fields
in question. 9 It would be a time-consuming task of dubious value to de-
velop more specific criteria for the selection of experts to address
particular types of factual disputes. Such criteria would only be as useful
as panel disputes are predictable. However, developing an inclusivity
standard whereby panels are instructed to include perspectives from
within and among different fields of expertise would be a significant im-
provement. When compelling differences exist in the ways in which the
members of different fields of expertise approach an issue in question,
representatives of differing perspectives should be invited to respond to
party and panelist questions. Particularly when the measures in question
represent departures from those set by international organizations, panels
should endeavor to recruit experts both from within and outside the in-
ternational organizations responsible for their promulgation.
Opening the process to include more diverse perspectives on an issue
would not necessarily mean that panelists would be forced to evaluate
every possible approach to an issue under dispute. The onus could be
placed upon parties to suggest and defend the types of expertise that
would be appropriate to call upon for their various claims, and opposing
parties could retain their already established right to challenge other par-
ties' suggestions. Furthermore, panels could continue to exercise their
control over the consultation process by developing more specific crite-
79. See supra Section II.A.
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ria for interpreting the proposed inclusivity standard on a panel-by-panel
basis.
B. Grant Explicit Rights to Directly Question and
Cross-Examine Experts
The DSU should be amended to grant parties both the right to pose
questions directly to experts and the right to cross-examine experts' re-
plies. The present mode of soliciting expert opinion leaves the panel with
most of the control over what written questions are submitted to the ex-
perts at the outset of expert consultation. While experts' responses are
later circulated among the parties for their comments, and if the panel
desires, additional oral questions at a meeting with the experts, the
panel's initial determinations of what constitute the issues of fact in the
dispute largely determine the range of issues considered. Granting
greater control to parties over the questions to be asked would enable
both parties and panelists to consider issues of perception and bias not
likely to be included in the panelists' determination of what constitute
the issues of dispute.
To be sure, both panelists and parties have important interests in en-
suring that the scope of the dispute resolution process remains focused
on the specific claims raised by the parties in the dispute. However, par-
ties have additional, countervailing interests in ensuring that the value of
the opinions offered by experts on these questions is properly discounted
for types of bias that may be present. Allowing parties the right to pose
questions directly to experts, both in the first round of written submis-
sions and during the meetings with experts to follow, could better enable
parties to situate expert testimony within the broader cultural, social,
political, and economic contexts of scientific practice.
Amending the DSU further to give parties the right to cross-examine
experts may be the best way to ensure that the relevant information about
each experts' opinions is brought to the fore. While Part I suggests sev-
eral ways in which contextual factors may have an influence on the types
of questions experts consider and the ways in which research is pursued,
specific instances of such influence will likely differ on a case-by-case
basis. Cross-examination would provide parties the freedom to further
expand on aspects of particular experts' opinions, and the latitude to
elicit the information that will better enable panelists to place these opin-
ions in context.
The common law tradition of cross-examining expert witnesses is
not without its detractors. ° Yet many if not all of the worst aspects of
80. Professor Samuel Gross offers a remarkable summary of how experts and the Ameri-
can lawyers who use them are often vilified. "Experts in other fields see lawyers as
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common law cross-examinations of experts would be absent or reduced
in WTO panel proceedings.8' Contrary to most common law trials involv-
ing expert testimony, for example, the experts selected in DSB
proceedings would not be the agents of either party, but rather agreed-
upon representatives of different fields of expertise opining on the issues
in dispute. The significant role that parties currently have in selecting
experts would likely prevent the more extreme lines of cross-
examination that attempt to undermine credibility of experts by focusing
on their paid affiliation with the parties. Instead, occurring as they would
after the parties have received experts' comments on the main factual
issues of the case, the parties' questions are more likely to track the re-
sponses already given by the experts, or to address concerns shared more
generally by parties involved in science-related disputes. For example,
parties might ask questions about the origins of particular standards or
interpretive conventions used by different expert systems, and the feasi-
bility or appropriateness of using them for the particular questions in
dispute. The opportunity to cross-examine the selected experts would
afford both the parties and the panelists a more comprehensive under-
standing of the scientific issues in their dispute, and the criteria used by
the scientists when rendering their opinions.
Some commentators have raised the additional concern that intro-
ducing more heterogeneity into the opinions that panelists receive would
result in more confusion, or worse, in panelists making evaluative judg-
ments on the merits of one particular approach versus another. Advocates
of this argument point to a wide gap in the type of methods and analysis
used by scientists and lay persons, suggesting that non-scientists are ul-
timately incapable of understanding scientific methods, data, and
research.82 Such a low estimation of lay-peoples' abilities to understand
complex phenomena is unwarranted. Late modernity gives even trade
unprincipled manipulators of their disciplines, and lawyers and experts alike see expert wit-
nesses-those members of learned professions that will consort with lawyers-as whores."
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (199 1). Likewise, Langbein
writes, comparing the use of experts in German court proceedings with that in the United
States, "Knowledgeable German jurists view our system of party-biased expertise with a mix-
ture of astonishment and contempt." John H. Langbein, Trashing the German Advantage, 82
Nw. U. L. REV. 763, 775 (1988).
8 1. Gross, seeming to push for a civil-common law hybrid by proposing to give greater
incentives to judges to exercise their power to select and consult with neutral experts, offers
the following observation to support his proposals for reforming expert testimony: "Most of
the disturbing characteristics of this battle [of experts] are a direct consequence of the initial
processes of partisan selection and preparation of experts: disagreements are all but inevitable,
areas of agreement are under-emphasized or ignored, disputes in the field are magnified, and
the consensus of experts, if any, is obscured." Gross, supra note 80, at 1175.
82. See Christoforou, supra note 4, 638-41; see also Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Tes-
timony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1539 (1998).
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experts manifold points of access to comprehend both the promise and
limitations of scientific expertise. Moreover, scientific knowledge may
be complex, but because of the scientific method, it is not unintelligible.
As for concerns that panelists will rely on one particular approach,
panelists' questions suggest a high level of appreciation of what is at
stake in their consultations with experts, and panelists have been defer-
ential to Member State interests when drawing their conclusions from
expert testimony. For example, when in Agricultural Products the Panel
could have drawn a more extensive inference from answers provided by
experts as to whether a product-by-product testing should apply to types
of fruits not specifically mentioned by the United States in its complaint,
the Panel chose not to do so. The Panel's deference to Member State pol-
icy was duly noted by the Appellate Body when the United States
pressed its position on this point on appeal.83
IV. ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS TO THE RIGHT EXPERTS
Another way to reflect on the issue of expert consultation in the
WTO is to consider the problem of posing the right questions to the right
experts. While the focus of this Note has thus far been on procedural
reforms to the WTO dispute process, the more important issue is more
substantial reform in the way that expertise is understood, not only in
scientific trade disputes, but also in other areas of trade regulation. In
short, we need to expand our understanding of who experts are, and be
more careful regarding the specific issues we direct to them.
Although panels have not yet offered specific criteria in their evalua-
tion of particular expert opinions, they have offered a more general
definition of what they mean by scientific: "a process characterized by
systematic, disciplined and objective enquiry and analysis, that is, a
mode of studying and sorting out facts and opinions.. . ." By this defi-
nition there exist many fields of expertise that could be considered
scientific, departing from the more narrow understanding of expertise
83. The AB noted:
At its meeting with the experts, the Panel asked them whether their statements
about varietal differences concerning apples, cherries, nectarines and walnuts were
also valid for apricots, pears, plums and quince. Dr. Heather answered this question
with an unqualified "yes" and the two other experts concurred. After having noted
that the experts did not further elaborate on their answers and that neither of the
parties provided any additional comments or information, the Panel came to the
conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence before it to extend its finding of
inconsistency with Article 2.2 to apricots, pears, plums and quince.
Appellate Body Agricultural Products report, supra note 33, para. 135.
84. Appellate Body Hormones report, supra note 3, para. 187.
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most commentators on the use of expertise in the WTO have taken for
granted."
At this point, some may throw up their hands and say that "it's better
to leave expert opinion out altogether." This kind of response only ig-
nores the basic necessity for expert systems in late modernity, an evasion
dangerous both to the citizens whom national regulations are meant to
benefit and, through Member States' citizens, the stability of the interna-
tional trade system. As pointed out already, modem life is complex, and
we need experts. Given this complexity, a more direct (and possibly le-
gitimacy-enhancing) approach would be to include more, not fewer
experts in the process, and to allow parties to ask broader questions
about the use of expert opinion.
Cross-examining the idea of expertise should also make us more
aware of the appropriateness of posing particular questions to particular
experts. Beyond assembling a group of experts who can speak to a par-
ticular issue of fact, the process of vetting experts should make panelists
and parties more aware of the specific competencies that various experts
possess. Experts competent to offer opinions on one aspect of a case may
not be competent to do so on others, and both panelists and parties must
be careful to avoid asking experts to speak beyond their fields of exper-
tise. As Howse and Mavroidis suggest, the Panels' posing of questions in
Hormones and Salmon suggest substantial confusion about what ques-
tions can be competently answered by particular experts. 6 As occurred in
Salmon, while a laboratory scientist may be competent to answer
whether frozen fish could be a vector of a particular parasite, it is
unlikely that she can offer opinions on the costs and benefits of particu-
lar regulatory alternatives. 8' The AB has confirmed that these
considerations are legitimately part of the purview of Member State
policymakers, 8  and therefore salient to panel outcomes. Such questions
may be better put to a regulatory economist, an accounting expert, or a
risk management specialist.
85. See Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strategy for
GMOs-The Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
317 (2000) (discussing the DSB's possible treatment of a trade dispute concerning the regula-
tion of genetically modified organisms). Howse and Mavroidis argue that the AB's definition
of scientific, and the AB's treatment of a minority opinion offered by an expert in Hormones
suggest its "broader understanding of science as reasoned inquiry or investigation-a notion
reflected in the broadness of meaning of the word for 'science' in other European languages,
for example Wissenschaft in German and Nauke in Russian." Id. at 334.
86. Id. at 348.
87. Id. at 348.





One of the most disturbing aspects of DSB proceedings, to both aca-
demic commentators and to WTO protesters alike, is the fact that trade
experts, who may lack the expertise in other areas of international law,
development, environment, labor law, human rights, and others are none-
theless making decisions about regulatory policies without the traditional
systems of democratic accountability available at the national level.
These decisions have serious implications for our everyday lives. In
some cases, such as in the Appellate Body's recent handling of the As-
bestos Panel report, the results can be reassuring. However, after several
decades of litigation on asbestos, most everyone--even trade lawyers-
knew about the hazards involved. In other cases, like Salmon, and others
no doubt likely to arise in the future, there may be a higher degree of
uncertainty.
Still, uncertainty, or knowing that we do not know everything about
a particular issue, is not so bad. Indeed, as long as panelists strive to de-
velop as objective an appraisal as possible of a given issue of fact, the
outcome should be acceptable to Member States and their constituents.
Indeed, Appellate Body officials have even made some reassuring ac-
knowledgments that governments can legitimately formulate policy
using minority positions in scientific fields.8 9
What is more worrying is the harm that can come from not knowing
that we do not know, or worse, thinking that we know what we do not.
These latter two situations underscore again the importance of asking the
right questions to the right people. It is deeply problematic that the SPS
and TBT agreements are the only WTO agreements that specifically di-
rect panelists to seek the input of outside experts. Imagine the
improvement if trade expert panelists, recognizing their potential lack of
expertise in areas like labor, human rights, environmental regulation, and
development began consulting with experts from these various fields as
part of their deliberations. Returning to the Socratic allegory referred to
at the outset of this Note, a heart problem may be better treated by a car-
diologist than an ear, nose, and throat specialist; building a bridge may
be better handled by a civil engineer and a team of experienced contrac-
tors than a weekend hobbyist.
As more science-based trade disputes appear before the DSB, the
dispute resolution process will become an increasingly important access
point for the work of experts and expert systems, testing countries and
their various constituencies' trust in expertise. Ultimately, the credibility
of the WTO rests on its ability to demonstrate that its selection of experts
89. Appellate Body Hormones report, supra note 3.
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and elicitation of expert testimony place panelists in the best position to
develop the assessments needed to resolve difficult issues fairly. The two
modifications to the DSU, SPS Agreement, and TBT Agreement pro-
posed in this Note are steps toward establishing better trust in this
process.
